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The Kentucky Approach to
Choice of Law: A Critique
By WILs L.M.

BEEs g *

This is a close case. Reasonable men could easily differ on
whether the law of Kentucky or of Ohio should have been applied.
And many persuasive reasons can be advanced to support the
conclusion of a majority of the Court that Kentucky law was
applicable. What is of principal interest-at least to this writeris the rationale or principle employed by the Court in reaching
that conclusion. Accordingly, a major portion of this paper will
be devoted to an analysis of the Court's reasoning and then only
at the end will there be a discussion of whether the case was
correctly decided and of how it could perhaps have been better
decided. What will be done here is typical of most of the recent
writing on choice of law, which has been directed primarily to
theory or method. By and large, there has been far less disagreement with the results reached by the courts than with the reasoning employed to attain these results. And the same can be
said of the major disputes in the so-called scholarly writing.
Without question, the prime problem in choice of law today is in
the area of approach or method.
All might agree that, in order to assist rather than to hinder
the development of the law, a principle or rationale employed
by a court in an opinion must meet the following requirements. It
should actually have influenced the court and not simply have
served as window-dressing for a result reached on other grounds.
It should state the reasons which, in the court's view, support the
conclusion expressed. Otherwise, there will be little basis for
evaluating the conclusion or for knowing how it was reached.
Finally, any principle or rationale should be expressed with sufficient precision to make reasonably clear the proper boundaries
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law and Director, Parker School of
Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University; Reporter, RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), CoNFlICT OF LAws.
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of its application; otherwise, it will not provide much guidance
to the courts in the decision of future cases. More serious is the
danger that it will be applied in situations which involve different
values but which do fall within its literal terms.
It seems reasonably apparent that the rationale of the Court
for applying Kentucky law in Foster v. Leggett does not satisfy
at least the last two requirements. Essentially, this rationale is
that "[w]hen the court has jurisdiction of the parties its primary
responsibility is to follow its own substantive law"' and that
accordingly if there are significant contacts-not necessarily the
most significant contacts-with Kentucky, the Kentucky law
should be applied. No reasons are given in support of this
rationale, and there is therefore no way of knowing the process
by which it was reached by the Court. Certainly, it would seem
to be wrong in its generality. A court should not apply its own
law-even if there are sufficient contacts-if the policy underlying
the particular rule would not be served by its application. Likewise, a court should at the least be hesitant to apply its law when
to do so would disappoint the legitimate expectations of the
parties. And, although this is perhaps more arguable, it seems
reasonable to say that, in the absence of an express legislative
directive, a court should not apply its own law in a situation
where some other state has an appreciably greater interest in the
resolution of the particular issue. Finally-and this is also arguable-it is suggested that, again in the absence of an express
legislative directive, a court should be hesitant to apply its law in
contravention of a well-established and currently accepted rule
of choice of law. To be sure, a court can be expected to be more
aware of, and sympathetic to, the policies embodied in its own
law than of those embodied in the law of other states. Also, in
close cases, it is perhaps to be expected that a court will be inclined to apply its own law instead of the law of another state.
To this extent at least, the rationale of the Kentucky Court has
validity. But surely it is not valid in the full sweep of its literal
application.
Foster v. Leggett is a close case where much can be said for
the application of Kentucky law. Accordingly, it does not provide
a good example of the difficulties implicit in the rationale em1484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972).
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ployed by the Court. A better example is provided by the Court's
earlier decision in Arnett v. Thompson.2 That case involved an
action by an Ohio wife to recover against her Ohio husband for
injuries suffered as a result of his alleged negligence while driving
their Ohio-registered automobile in Kentucky. The husband's
defense was twofold: first, that under Ohio law a husband is
immune from tort liability to his wife and second, that also under
Ohio law an automobile host is only liable for injuries caused his
guest by willful and wanton conduct. The Court found for the
wife by applying the contrary Kentucky law to the decision of
both issues. It reasoned that "the conflicts question should.., be
determined . . . simply on the basis of whether Kentucky has
enough contacts to justify applying Kentucky law. Under that
view if the accident occurs in Kentucky (as in the instant case)
there is enough contact from that fact alone to justify applying
Kentucky law."3
Surely, this is unsatisfactory. No reasons are given for the
conclusion reached. Ohio would appear to have had a far greater
interest than Kentucky in the decision of the case. More puzzling
still, the opinion gives no indication of what interest, if any, of
Kentucky was served by the application of its law. Under the
circumstances, one cannot help surmising that perhaps the principal motivating factors behind the decision were the Court's
desire to give recovery to the wife and its dislike for the Ohio
interspousal immunity rule and the Ohio guest-passenger statute.
If this surmise is correct, the rationale of the Kentucky Court fails
to satisfy not only the last two of the three requirements mentioned above but the first one as well. Namely, it does not reflect
the actual reasoning of the Court but serves as window-dressing
for a result reached on other grounds.
The difficulties implicit in the Court's rationale can perhaps be
made clearer by consideration of two hypothetical situations. Let
us first suppose that it is Kentucky which has the guest-passenger
statute while Ohio does not, and that a Kentucky domiciliary is
injured in Ohio while riding as a guest in the automobile of his
Ohio host. Would the Kentucky Court apply its own law in this
situation to bar recovery by the Kentucky plaintiff? Clearly, it
2 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).

3 Id. at 113.

1973]

ThE KmqTucxY APPROACH

would if it applied its rationale literally, since surely the Kentucky
domicile of the plaintiff would be enough contact with Kentucky
to justify application of Kentucky law. And the same might be
true if the Court were to amend its rationale to provide that Kentucky law should only be applicable in these circumstances if a
purpose underlying that law would be served. For it seems probable that at least one purpose of the typical guest-passenger
statute is to guard against the ingratitude of the guest.' And if
this were true of our imaginary Kentucky statute, it would not
be absurd to suggest that its purpose might be advanced by its
application to prevent Kentuckians, wherever they may have been
injured, from evincing ingratitude by suing their hosts in Kentucky courts for injuries caused by simple negligence.
Now, for the second hypothetical, let us assume that Kentucky
law provides for interspousal immunity while the law of Ohio
does not, and that an Ohio wife is injured in Kentucky through
the negligence of her husband. Again would the Kentucky Court
apply its law to bar recovery by the wife? Clearly, it would if
it were to take literally its statement in Arnett v. Thompson that
Kentucky law should be applied whenever Kentucky has enough
contact to justify such application and "if the accident occurs in
Kentucky... there is enough contact from that fact alone."5 And
the same might be true even if the Court were to amend its
rationale to require that some purpose underlying the Kentucky
law must be served. For the policy, if indeed there was a policy,
underlying the common law rule of interspousal immunity has
become obscured by the passage of time. Quite possibly the rule
was based on no firmer ground than the notion that in contemplation of law husband and wife are one and that a person cannot sue
himself.6 If this was its basis, the imaginary Kentucky rule might
be thought to concern a type of litigation that may not be brought
in the local courts. If so, the purpose of the rule would be served
by its application to bar the wife's suit.
The purposes attributed to these two imaginary Kentucky
rules may seem far-fetched. The fact remains, however, that it is
frequently not possible to know with any degree of certainty what
4 Cf. Dym v. Gordon 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965); Trautman,
Comments on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 465, 469-70 (1967).
5 433 S.W.2d at 113.
6RESTA wENT (SEcoND), CoNFIacr oF"LAws § 169, comment b (1969).
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purpose, or purposes, were originally sought to be achieved by a
common law rule. And the same is likely to be true of the typical
state statute whose legislative history is obscure. If therefore a
court were to take seriously a principle that its local law should
be applied in every case where there are sufficient contacts and
where a purpose of its law would be served, it would have to be
extremely liberal in determining what might be a purpose. Otherwise, it would run the danger of being result-selective, that is of
attributing a purpose to a rule in order to reach a result it deemed
desirable.
It seems as certain as anything can be certain in the law that
the Kentucky Court would not apply Kentucky law in either of
the two hypothetical cases discussed above. But, in order to avoid
doing so, it would have to abandon, or at least substantially
modify, the rationale it employed in its opinions in Foster and
Arnett. This in turn suggests that this rationale does not provide
a good basis for deciding cases and indeed may lead the courts to
bad results, as it very probably did in Arnett. It may be interesting to note that in each of the three cases involving guest-passenger statutes that were decided by the Kentucky Court since its
abandonment of the place-of-injury rule, 7 the chosen Kentucky
rule granted recovery to the plaintiff while recovery would have
been denied by the rule whose application was rejected. One
cannot therefore help wondering whether these three decisions
were not based at least in part on the notion that when, in a
personal injury action, the choice is between a rule that will grant
and a rule that will deny recovery to the plaintiff, the rule that will
grant recovery should be applied provided that it belongs to a
state having sufficient contacts with the parties and the occurrence. There might well be merit in such a notion, since one of
the most basic purposes of tort law is to provide compensation to
a plaintiff for his injuries.8 And surely at least one of a judge's
objectives in a choice of law case should be to further the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law that is involved.'
But if this notion played a part in the Court's reasoning, should
it not have been explicitly so stated in the opinions? Judicial
7 The first of these cases was Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
The others were Arnett v. Thompson and Foster v. Leggett.
S W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 22-23 (4th ed. 1971).
9 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFmCr OF LAWS § 6 (1969).
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candor is a virtue. An opinion cannot aid substantially in the
development of the law unless it accurately sets forth the reasons
that led the court to its conclusion.
Let us now turn to the question of how Foster v. Leggett
should have been decided. It is difficult to imagine a case where
the contacts were more equally divided or where the interests
of the states involved were in greater equipois. Under the circumstances, one could hardly criticize application of either Kentucky or Ohio law. The more interesting question is the route
that the Court should ideally have taken in arriving at its conclusion.
If I were forced to decide, I think I would probably conclude
that Ohio law should be applied. I cannot, however, be as confident as was Judge Reed in his dissenting opinion that Section
175 of the Restatement (Second) would call for this result. To be
sure, this section, in company with many of the other sections in
the Torts Chapter, creates a presumption in favor of application
of the law of the place of injury. But this is a rather weak presumption, since the law of the place of injury is not to be applied
where some other state has a more significant relationship under
the principles stated in Section 6 to the occurrence and the parties.
This latter section, which is the basic choice of law section of
the Restatement (Second), requires the court to consider a number
of factors in arriving at a choice of law decision. These factors
would not, it is thought, clearly point in Foster v. Leggett to the
application of the law of Ohio, the place of injury, since the contacts were so closely divided between Kentucky and Ohio. In
particular, the defendant was a resident, although not a domiciliary, of Kentucky; the relationship between the parties was
undoubtedly centered in that state; and the trip began, and was
to end, in Kentucky. 10 The factors listed in Section 6 do, however,
give some indication of the route to follow by including among
their number certainty, predictability and uniformity of result
as well as ease in the determination of the law to be applied.
By way of contrast, it seems reasonably clear that the Restatement (Second) would call for a result different from that reached
by the Kentucky Court in Arnett v. Thompson." In that case, it
1

ORESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFar oF LAws

(1969). 109 (Ky. 196]8).
comment
11433d S.W.2d

§ 145, comment e and § 146,
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will be recalled, Kentucky had no contact with the parties other
than the fact that the accident took place within its territory, and
it was at least not apparent that application of Kentucky law
would advance any of its purposes. Ohio clearly had the greater,
if not the only, interest, and under the Restatement (Second), and
Section 6 in particular, this would be an important factor favoring
application of Ohio law. In addition, interspousal immunity was
one of the issues involved in the Arnett case; with respect to this
issue the Restatement (Second) is quite precise, since it calls for
the usual application of the local law of the state of the parties'
domicile on the ground that this state will almost invariably be
the state of greatest concern.' 2 In Arnett, this state was Ohio,
and no substantial reason was advanced by the Court for not
applying Ohio law.
Let us now turn once again to Foster v. Leggett. It bears
reiteration that this was an extremely close case and that, at least
in this writer's opinion, much could be said in favor of applying
either Kentucky or Ohio law. The more interesting question is
whether the Kentucky Court is doing justice either to itself or
to the parties by the approach it is now taking in deciding
whether or not to apply the guest-passenger statute of another
state. At the present time, the Court decides each case on an ad
hoe basis: the majority by inquiring whether Kentucky has enough
contact to justify application of Kentucky law and Judge Reed by
asking, in line with the Restatement (Second), whether the presumption in favor of application of the law of the place of injury
has been overcome. Neither of these approaches provides much
predictability of result and, as a consequence, the Court can expect to be faced with many appeals and the parties to a case
will not know whether to settle before suit or the amount for
which to settle. A better approach would be to attempt to develop
choice of law rules that are precise enough and clear enough to
cover at least the easier cases involving the guest-passenger. To
be sure, choice of law rules have worked badly in the past, but
this was primarily because the rules were few in number and
broad in scope and, quite understandably, sometimes led to bad
12

RESTATEmzNT (ScoND), CoNF.acT OF LAWS

§ 169 (1969).
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results in situations that fell within their literal terms. 13 On the
other hand, the applicability of a foreign guest-passenger statute
would appear to be an issue which is sufficiently narrow and about
which enough is known to justify the expectation that at least
some definite choice of law rules could be stated that would work
well in practice. Chief Judge Fuld of the New York Court of
Appeals tried his hand at stating such rules in his concurring
opinion in Tooker v. Lopez' 4 and these rules received the approval of a majority of the court in Neumeier v. Kuehner.15 These
rules are:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and the car is there registered, the law
of that state should control and determine the standard of care
which the host owes to the guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his
domicile and that state does not cast him in liability for that
conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact
that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of
the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest
was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who had come into that state should
not-in the absence of special circumstances-be permitted to
interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are
domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that
of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be
shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing
the smooth working of the multistate system or producing
great uncertainty for litigants.'1
These are the sort of rules, it is suggested, which courts should
seek to develop. They are directed to a narrow issue which has
13 As for example, the rule that rights and liabilities in tort are governed by
the law of te place of injury and that the validity of a contract is governed by the
law of the place of making.
'424 N.Y.2d 569, 585, 249 N.E.2d 394, 403 (1969).
1 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
16 Id. at 125, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58.
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been many times in various aspects before the courts and whose
confines are reasonably clear. They give precise solutions (in
rules 1 and 2) to aspects of the issue that seem clear and then
with respect to the remaining aspects leave the door open for
further exploration (in rule 3) while at the same time offering
some guidance to the courts, much in the vein of the Restatement
(Second), by providing that "[n]ormally" the applicable rule of
decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred.
No rule made by man can be expected to be perfect. Undoubtedly,
Chief Judge Fuld's rules will on occasion lead to a result that
might not be considered ideal. But it is confidently believed that
they will work well in the great majority of cases, and the predictability, certainty and ease of application that good rules bring
are well worth the occasional price they may entail.
Chief Judge Fuld's rules would have led to a different result
in Foster v. Leggett than that reached by the Kentucky Court.
Since the defendant was domiciled in Ohio and the accident
occurred there the second of these rules would have called for
application of the Ohio guest-passenger statute. It would be
difficult to criticize such a result. The parties almost certainly
did not act in reliance upon the application of either Kentucky
or Ohio law, and the respective interests of the two states in the
decision of the case would seem to be almost equally balanced.
But, of course, there would be nothing to prevent the Kentucky
Court from amending Chief Judge Fuld's rules or from devising
new rules of its own. Few could seriously object, for example, to
amending the first rule to provide that the law of the state where
guest-passenger and host-driver reside (instead of "are domiciled")
should determine the standard of care which the host owes the
guest even though the automobile is not registered in that state.
Such a rule would have led to application of Kentucky law in
the Foster case. The only point made here is that well-thoughtout rules should have as important a role to play in choice of law
as they have in other areas of the common law. Probably, these
rules will have to be large in number and narrow in scope. Undoubtedly, not enough is known about many areas of choice of
law to justify an attempt at the present time to regulate them by
rule. Until we learn more about these areas, we will have to
remain content with an ad hoc approach, perhaps aided by a

1978]

THE KENTUCKY APPROACH

877

broad presumption of the sort found in the Restatement (Second).
But the courts should be on the lookout for issues and situations
about which enough is known at the present time to justify an
attempt at the statement of rules. Perhaps the rules first stated
will prove defective in the light of later experience, as has also
been true of many other common law rules. In any event, these
rules will form the basis on which other courts can build and
should eventually bring to choice of law some measure of certainty, predictability and ease of application, which are important
values in all areas of law. It is believed that enough is known
about the problems raised by guest-passenger statutes in choice
of law to warrant an attempt to state some precise rules. It is
hoped that the Kentucky Court will try its hand at stating such
rules on some later occasion.

